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Abstract—Recent literature has demonstrated the improved
data discovery and delivery efficiency gained through applying
named data networking (NDN) to a variety of information-centric
Internet of things (IoT) applications. However, from a data
security perspective, the development of NDN-IoT raises several
new authentication challenges. In particular, NDN-IoT authen-
tication may require per-packet-level signatures, thus imposing
intolerably high computational and time costs on the resource-
poor IoT end devices. This paper proposes an effective solu-
tion by seamlessly integrating the lightweight and unforgeable
physical-layer identity (PHY-ID) into the existing NDN signature
scheme for the mobile edge computing (MEC)-enabled NDN-IoT
networks. The PHY-ID generation exploits the inherent signal-
level device-specific radio-frequency imperfections of IoT devices,
including the in-phase/quadrature-phase imbalance, and thereby
avoids adding any implementation complexity to the constrained
IoT devices. We derive the offline maximum entropy-based
quantization rule and propose an online two-step authentication
scheme to improve the accuracy of the authentication decision
making. Consequently, a cooperative MEC device can securely
execute the costly signing task on behalf of the authenticated IoT
device in an optimal manner. The evaluation results demonstrate
1) elevated authentication time efficiency, 2) robustness to sev-
eral impersonation attacks including the replay attack and the
computation-based spoofing attack, and 3) increased differentia-
tion rate and correct authentication probability by applying our
integration design in MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks.
Index Terms—Internet of things, collaborative mobile edge
computing, physical-layer security, named date networking.
I. INTRODUCTION
TO build secure, scalable smart city networks, an enor-mous variety of new Internet of things (IoT) devices
are deployed ubiquitously every day to sense every concern
of the city with minimal human intervention and to provide
the sensed data to various information-centric applications
via the Internet. As part of efforts to supportively address
the explosive increase in IoT data traffic, investigations of
mobile edge computing (MEC) architecture and named data
networking (NDN) have aroused extensive attention in re-
cent years. The MEC-enabled IoT can supplement the cloud
computing-based IoT through harvesting the cache/storage
ability, the idle computational capacity, and the context-aware
resources located at the network edge [1]. NDN with the
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abilities of data content naming1 and in-network caching can
be beneficial to the IoT in terms of supporting device mobility
[3] and raising the efficiency of data discovery and delivery
[2] for the information-centric applications, such as intelligent
transportation systems [4], [5] and building automation and
management systems [6]. These IoT applications need to
monitor and process big volumes of sensitive information
collected from a large number of simple sensors. Given
the open nature of wireless propagation and the constrained
computational power of wireless IoT end devices (EDs), EDs
are especially vulnerable to the impersonation-based DDoS
attacks, e.g., content poisoning [7]. From the data security
perspective, authentication is of significant importance either
before granting any connectivity of IoT devices to the NDN
or accepting any contents from the NDN data producers.
A. Research Motivations
In most host-centric IoT applications, data provenance
is guaranteed by authenticating an instantaneous end-to-end
(E2E) communication channel/session. While the information-
centric NDN-IoT applications need to validate the data packets
that are fetched from the intermediate caches [2], [5]. In
this regard, the authentication task of NDN has to tie to
the content of every data packet directly rather than securing
the E2E connection. Currently, NDN relies on the digital
signature to protect the data provenance at the network layer,
which, most of the time, requires the data producer (i.e.,
IoT end devices) to execute asymmetric cryptography at a
packet granularity [4], [8]–[10]. The workload of the signing
task can be intolerably high, especially for low-end sensor-
based IoT devices [11], [12]. Therefore, offloading such heavy
cryptographic workloads from constrained IoT devices is
promising for implementing efficient and secure NDN-IoT
networks, motivating the exploitation of the two following
helpful techniques.
Per-signal-level PHY RF fingerprinting: At a wireless IoT
transmitter, every encapsulated NDN packet will be sent to
the physical layer and radiated through the RF front-end and
is thus inevitably affected by the RF imperfection parameters.
At the receiver, these device-specific parameters can be ex-
tracted from any NDN packet and can represent the unique
fingerprint/identity of the ED. Moreover, the estimation of RF
parameters is usually a mandatory function of a receiver for
1In NDN-IoT, the information produced by the IoT end devices at the
network edge can be regarded as content [2].
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2signal compensation purposes. These readily available esti-
mates can be cost-effectively used to produce an unforgeable
PHY identity (PHY-ID) for transmitter authentication [13]–
[17], which has the potential to help relieve the excessive
computational burden of the signature encryption.
Exploitation of MEC: MEC devices (MECDs) located at the
network edge can quickly observe/collect the PHY information
of the served IoT devices, including the RF fingerprints,
and usually possess more powerful CPUs than the EDs for
performing encryption. The NDN naming and in-network
caching schemes with built-in interest/data primitives are well-
suited for MEC-enabled networks [18], [19].
Consequently, it is practically feasible to replace the NDN
packet signing at the resource-constrained ED with two steps:
1) MECD authenticates ED using PHY-ID, and 2) MECD
works with the authenticated EDs in a coordinated manner
to offload the signing task from EDs [20]–[22].
B. Related Work and Technical Problems
In the field of NDN signature schemes, the US-founded
NDN project [8] defined the architecture and functions of
packet signature-based authentication. The detailed, usable
NDN signature scheme was introduced in [23]. The work in [9]
and [11] reported the high-cost problem caused by executing
signature-based authentication at simple IoT sensors without
providing detailed solutions. An encryption authentication pro-
tocol in which the data provider and consumer should directly
find each other with agreed services at the mobile edge was de-
signed in [19]. The studies of [24] and [25] integrated identity-
based cryptography (IBC) and hierarchical IBC into NDN for
authentication purposes. In a recent study [4], a symmetric
key-based IoT device (standard node) authentication along
with NDN routing was proposed for the smart city scenario.
However, applying these methods in NDN-IoT could require
additional encryptions to be carried out by the constrained IoT
devices. Most importantly, the inherent problem of the above-
mentioned cryptography-based authentication methods is that
the impersonation attackers with rapidly growing processing
power are capable of compromising or even reconstructing the
encryption credentials (e.g., key and certificate) of a resource-
limited IoT device in a much shorter time than before [16],
e.g., via brute-force computation. The encryption credentials
are essentially virtual numbers that are not directly associated
with the hardware of IoT devices. In this case, an attacker
possessing the correct credentials could be authenticated and
can thus inject poisoned contents into NDN without triggering
any alarm. However, due to the limited memory, computing,
and energy capacities of IoT data providers, it is impractical
to prevent the computation-based malicious cryptanalysis by
straightforwardly increasing the computational intractability of
the NDN-IoT system, e.g., using a longer key.
In this case, [8] highlighted the prospects of investigating a
secure collaboration scheme that allows trusted proxies to sign
on behalf of the constrained devices. The authors of [6] con-
sidered using the gateway to sign packets on behalf of the ED
in building management systems. In [20]–[22], several collab-
orative task offloading schemes that exploit the CPU resources
between MECDs and end users were investigated. Given that
the signature in NDN packet is used for data provenance
verification, the authenticity of “signing task provider” should
be verified before the MECD accepts the unsigned packets,
but with two requirements: 1) the authentication cannot impose
much additional computational burden on resource-constrained
EDs, and 2) the ED authentication can be completed even at
the packet granularity.
Signal-level PHY RF fingerprinting can meet these two
requirements and can be used in the MEC-enabled NDN-
IoT networks as mentioned earlier. In [26], RF-based de-
vice fingerprinting was surveyed, and the implementation
of modulation domain in-phase/quadrature-phase imbalance
(IQI)-based fingerprinting was reported to be less complicated
than that of the waveform domain methods. In [13], [27]–
[29], unclonable IQI fingerprints were used to authenticate
wireless transmitters in different device-to-device scenarios.
The studies of [16], [30] proved that the stable RF-based PHY-
ID is suitable for integration into cryptography primitives for
the dynamically fluid IoT environment. The well-established
RF fingerprinting technology is robust in nature due to the
immense difficulty in arbitrarily changing hardware-level RF
features within the short duration of an authentication ses-
sion. Additionally, given the low distinguishability of range-
limited RF parameters, the authors of [30] used the entropy
to measure the randomness of PHY-ID and proposed the
multiple-attributes multiple-observations (MAMO) technique
to improve the authentication accuracy through increasing the
entropy. However, the optimal entropy-based method was not
derived, and thus its performance under a high density of IoT
devices is obviously deteriorated. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, the practical exploitation of PHY fingerprinting
and MEC architecture for NDN-IoT authentication still faces
two technical challenges.
Challenge 1: A design is needed to integrate PHY finger-
printing into NDN-IoT signature scheme seamlessly in order
to accomplish secure signing task offloading.
Challenge 2: Achieving high authentication accuracy and
strong robustness in a high-density IoT environment.
C. Our Contributions
This paper investigates the integration of PHY fingerprinting
into the NDN-IoT signature scheme to achieve the signing task
offloading and address the above challenges. We consider an
MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network in which groups of IoT EDs
can serve as the data providers, an MEC device can be a small-
scale data center co-located with the gateway that connects IoT
devices and the NDN, and NDN is capable of preliminarily
processing the received NDN interest/data packets. In an
offline phase, the MECD can prepare the maximum entropy-
based (MEB) quantization rules and register the legitimate
PHY-IDs, which are associated with the RF IQI of the EDs. By
integrating this PHY-ID into the NDN-IoT signature scheme,
the MECD can examine packets provenance using our two-
step authentication, securely execute the costly signing task
on behalf of the authenticated IoT device in an optimal
manner, and finally publish the contents under its application-
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Fig. 1. Network structure of the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT system.
defined namespace. The technical contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows.
• We complete the integration design with limited computa-
tional complexity imposed on the constrained IoT device.
As a result, the packet signing task can be securely of-
floaded from the constrained IoT devices, which improves
the time efficiency of the NDN-IoT network.
• Given that diverse estimation methods can produce differ-
ent IQI parameters, we derive the MEB quantization rule
to generally address various IQI parameters rather than
merely a specific one. Using our offline MEB quantizer
and online two-step authentication, the authentication
accuracy is improved in terms of the increased differ-
entiation rate and correct authentication probability.
• Compared to traditional encryption-based security, our
PHY-aided authentication exhibits stronger resistance to
an impersonation attacker with the compromised signing
key and thus can effectively prevent content poisoning
DDoS attacks in NDN-IoT networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system framework and the proposed method
are described. The proposed offline MEB quantization rule,
integration design, online two-step authentication, and signing
task offloading are described in Section III, Section IV, Section
V, and Section VI, respectively. Section VII evaluates the
performance of the proposed method. The conclusions are
presented in Section VIII.
Notations: (·)∗, b·c, d·e, and (·)T denote conjugate, floor
function, ceiling function, and transpose operations, respec-
tively. Bold lowercase and uppercase letters represent vectors
and matrices, respectively. a(i) denotes the ith element of
vector a. det(A) is the determinant of matrix A. <(x) and
=(x) denote the real part and imaginary part of x, respectively.
max(·) and min(·) return the maximum value and minimum
value.
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE SYSTEM AND PROPOSED
METHOD
A. Overview of the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT Network and RF
Signal Model
Fig. 1 illustrates the considered MEC-enabled NDN-IoT
network. A cluster of IoT EDs can serve as the data provider
to send data to consumers via a gateway using NDN packet
forwarding (the red line shows this data flow). The consumer
at the other end can access the content of interest via an
IoT application. The gateway connects the EDs and NDN
to receive EDs’ packets and publish the contents of interest
to NDN under its namespace [2], [10]. An MECD can be
a resource-rich, small-scale data center that is co-located
with the gateway and is granted the privilege via gateway
for executing the costly computing tasks such as the packet
signing. The gateway can take over the responsibilities of the
MECD if it has sufficient computing power for the signing
task offloading. As shown in the figure, MECD/gateway can
communicate with EDs directly or via a trusted cluster head
(CH) node.
At an ED, the NDN-IoT data packet can be encapsulated at
the application layer under its own prefix and finally sent down
to the physical layer for analog RF signal emission. We assume
that an ED’s imperfect RF front-end can process signals using
the in-phase/quadrature-phase (IQ) processing, where the sig-
nals suffer from the imbalanced gain and phase-shift between
I-channel and Q-channel mainly due to the imperfect local
oscillator and mixer [31]. We use θ and α to represent phase-
shift mismatch and amplitude mismatch, respectively, where
the independent θ and α follow the uniform distributions ,
θ ∼ U(−θm, θm) and α ∼ U(−αm, αm), and θm > 0 and
αm > 0 are regulated by the RF manufacturer/market [30],
[32], [33]. We consider that all EDs in the MECD’s coverage
are produced under the same maximum α and θ requirement.
At the receiver side, the received signals with IQI effect can
be represented as [30], [34]
z = [c1H(1 + (1 + α)e
jθ) + c2H
∗(1− (1 + α)e−jθ)]x
2
+ [c1H(1− (1 + α)ejθ) + c2H∗(1 + (1 + α)e−jθ)]x
∗
2
,
(1)
where x denotes the transmitted symbol vector in a time
instant, H is the corresponding channel gain matrix, and c1
and c2 are two constants representing the IQI of the receiver.
Usually, the IQI estimation is a mandatory function of the
signal receiver for IQI compensation, and the estimated IQI
parameter can be generally represented by
aˆ = a+ na, (2)
where aˆ and a denote the estimated and actual values of
the constant IQI parameter, respectively, and na denotes the
estimation noise that follows na ∼ N (0, σ2) [13], [35]. Here,
a is a function of θ and α; the different forms of a will be
discussed in Section III.
4Typically, NDN-IoT requires that all data packets are signed
by the private signing key (PvtKEDA ) of the resource-
constrained EDA for data provenance authentication, where
EDA denotes the end device A. The packet signing is based
on asymmetric encryption, which employs, for example, ECC
and RSA in most NDN networks. This could impose a
heavy computational workload on the constrained EDA and
significantly delay the packet uploading. It is assumed that
EDs cannot afford the per-packet-level asymmetric encryption
when preparing the packets due to their limited computation
capacities; meanwhile, the MECD is assumed to be uncon-
strained. The private-public key pair and certificate generation
and distribution are beyond the scope of our paper; interested
readers can refer to [4], [6], [36].
This paper focuses on how to replace the task of signing
NDN packets at the EDs with the following two steps:
• Step 1: MECD first authenticates an ED using IQI-based
PHY-ID accurately 1) under the dense IoT environment
and 2) without imposing excessive computational com-
plexity on this ED.
• Step 2: MECD offloads the signing task from the au-
thenticated ED through accepting parts of the unsigned
packets and completes the packet signing.
B. Threat Model and Assumptions
Given the vulnerability of resource-limited EDs, we con-
sider that the DDoS attacker’s objective is to inject poisoned
contents into the NDN cache via impersonating the legitimate
EDs. We assume that the attackers with high computing power
can compromise or even reconstruct the signing key of an
ED within the lifetime of signature through key leaking,
replaying the captured packets, brute-force computation, etc.
It is assumed the attackers can be aware of the current pending
interest for particular content or can anticipate the popular in-
terests of consumers. Hence, such attackers are able to produce
poisoned contents under a popular name prefix, sign contents
using the compromised key, and try to publish the poisoned
data packets on NDN. We suppose that the consumers know
the trust schema for data provenance verification and that the
trust anchors do not change over time (i.e., consumers know
how to construct valid certification chains). Consequently,
although the consumer or NDN router can reach the correct
certificate along the trust chain, none of them can determine
the signature of attacker as invalid if purely relying on the
traditional encryption-based method; thus, they will accept the
poisoned contents without triggering any alarm. In addition,
we assume that the EDs’ DDoS attacks targeting MECD
without using any identity impersonation/spoofing methods
will be detected by the MECD.
C. Framework of the Proposed Offline/Online Counter Solu-
tion and Assumptions
To accomplish the aforementioned two-step strategy, we
propose to integrate the IQI-based PHY-ID into the existing
signature-based NDN-IoT authentication scheme with the aid
of MECD, which consists of an offline phase and an online
phase. In the following, as MECD and gateway are co-located,
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Fig. 2. Main procedures of the offline phase.
we use the two terms interchangeably when presenting the
communication procedures for simplicity.
1) Offline phase: The offline phase is responsible for
preparing the MEB quantization rule, as well as generating and
registering the PHY-ID of the legitimate EDs, as shown in Fig.
2. We consider to address a legitimate EDA with IQI parameter
aA as an example. Since the IQI of EDA automatically affects
all transmitted RF signals, the MECD is able to extract
aA from any received packets of EDA (Hello Message in
the figure) or obtain aA through the relaying of CH. Then,
MECD can input aA into the proposed MEB quantizer to
generate q(aˆA) and PHY-IDA of EDA and send PHY-IDA,
two primitive numbers P and G, and MAC[PHY-IDA, P,G]
back to EDA, where MAC[· · · ] denotes the hashed-message
authentication code (MAC) and q(·) is a quantization function
defined as
q(aˆ) = a[m], m = 1, 2 · · ·M (3)
where M denotes the number of quantization levels. We
define PHY-ID , hash(a[m]), where hash(·) denotes the
hash function. After that, EDA and MECD need to es-
tablish a shared session key (kEDA−MECD), for example,
using Diffie-Hellman key exchange in our case. Note that
if kEDA−MECD is generated using a technique other than
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, then P and G do not need
to be included in the “Hello Message”. EDA and MECD
can exchange [PHY-IDA]kEDA−MECD to confirm whether the
same kEDA−MECD and PHY-IDA are shared through the
“Finished Message”, where [· · · ]k denotes the message en-
crypted by k. Finally, MECD registers (aA, q(aA))PHY-IDA
in the whitelist as legitimate and creates a mapping re-
lationship between PHY-IDA and EDA’s name prefix like
“/ndn/ucla/.../sensor/A/voltage/....”, where /sensor/A/voltage
denotes the voltage data of EDA. Thereafter, EDA needs to
add this registered PHY-IDA to the frame header of its medium
access control layer when preparing the data packets if EDA
requires the help of the MECD for signature delegation.
We assume that MECD knows θm and αm when determin-
ing the MEB quantization rule and that all devices are capable
of completing the key exchange and enough times of hashed-
MAC. The public key of MECD/gateway can be obtained from
an authorized manager by any entity who needs to verify its
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signature. It is also assumed that all devices are trusted during
the offline preparation. The authentication and confidentiality
orientated encryptions are used to secure the communication
between MECD and CH if a direct link between the ED and
MECD does not exist.
2) Online phase: In the online phase, we consider that
an IoT EDB claiming PHY-IDA tries to send the unsigned
NDN-IoT data packets to the MECD, as shown in Fig. 3.
After exchanging the signing request and ACK messages,
EDB can verify MECD’s signature in the ACK and sends
unsigned NDN data packets to MECD. The MECD can
obtain aB , which is physically associated with the RF of
the current EDB and, thus, can examine the claimed PHY-
IDA using our two-step authentication (presented in Section
V). If authentication fails, the unsigned NDN data packets
are rejected. If the identity is verified, MECD can confirm
that the unsigned packets are truly sent by the legitimate
EDA = EDB , obtain the signing key SKEDA in the form
of [SKEDA ]kEDA−MECD ,MAC[[SKEDA ]kEDA−MECD ], execute
the costly signing task on behalf of the validated EDB and
cache the signed data packet in the content store (CS) of an
NDN node. At the other end, the NDN router may receive the
consumer’s interest packet and check CS for an interest-name
match. If a match is found, the interest request can be satisfied
by feeding the cached contents to the consumer. If one is not
found, pending interest table (PIT) lookup could be performed
to see if a previous unsatisfied interest with the same name is
still pending. Only if a PIT entry does not exist, the interest is
forwarded according to the forwarding information base, and
a new PIT entry is created.
3) Assumptions: It is assumed that IQI estimation is manda-
tory at the signal receiver (MECD/CH), for example, using
[34], [37]–[39]. Therefore, MECD can process the readily
available aˆ in both the offline and online phases. The noise
term na in (2) can be ignored in offline registration. The
hardware-level a can be stable as a constant during a period
that is much longer than a regular authentication session,
and thus na can be remarkably eliminated based on increas-
ingly many samples of aˆ, e.g., using diversity combining
techniques. However, this na is not negligible in a specific
online authentication test due to insufficient samples of this
ED’s aˆ. All devices cannot be physically captured/broken
without triggering any alarm, and the cooperative MECD/CH
are always trusted. This study focuses mainly on the per-
spective of authenticating the data producer ED. Notably, our
method can also be applied to the data consumer since the
RF parameters can also be extracted from the NDN interest
packet if it is transmitted by the wireless node-based consumer.
Since signing the interest packet is not mandatory in NDN,
the consumer-related authentication issues are not discussed.
In addition to the authentication, we suppose that the data
integrity and confidentiality are protected by the hash-based
encryption and the session key-based encryption, respectively,
and therefore, we do not discuss them in this paper.
In the next sections, we present several key techniques
according to the order of process flow, including the MEB-
based PHY-ID generation (Section III), the seamless integra-
tion of PHY-ID into the NDN-IoT signature (Section IV), and
the online two-step authentication (Section V). Finally, we
combine them into an algorithm in Section VI.
III. OFFLINE MEB QUANTIZATION RULES
In this section, we derive the MEB quantization rule for
PHY-ID generation. Given the probability density functions
(PDFs) of θ and α, the EDs’ parameters a are random variables
with a specific PDF, fA(·). In the case of nonuniform distribu-
tion, the distribution of a can be denser in some quantization
intervals, implying a higher probability for different a to
appear in these intervals. This could result in deteriorated
decision accuracy in testing q(aA) and q(aB). Thus, it is
important to consider the PDF of a in designing the quantizer.
Generally, the Shannon entropy of a[m] can be given by
H = −
M∑
m=1
f˜A(a[m]) log2 f˜A(a[m]), (4)
where f˜A(a[m]) denotes the probability mass function of a[m].
Lemma 1: In the authentication context, the minimization
of f˜A(a[m]),m = 1, 2, · · · ,M, leads to the maximized distin-
guishability of a[m] and PHY-IDs.
As the measurement of randomness, max(H) can be
interpreted as the maximized randomness of the possible
a[m]/PHY-IDs. For the purpose of distinguishing EDs, it is
expected that different EDs’ IQI parameters can be quantized
into different PHY-IDs with the maximized probability given
fA(·). Since f˜A(a[m]) > 0, max(H) can be obtained by
minimizing all f˜A(a[m]) based on (4).
Theorem 1: Based on Lemma 1, the MEB quantizer can
be obtained by making the quantization boundaries bm, m =
0, 1, · · · ,M − 1, satisfy{
b0 = amin,
bm+1 = F
−1
a
(
1
M + Fa(bm)
)
,
(5)
where a ∈ [amin, amax] and Fa(·) denotes the antiderivative
function of fA(·).
Proof : See Appendix A.
However, the challenge of using (5) is that a could have
different representations due to the diversity of IQI estimation
techniques. Generally, the representation of a can be classified
into two cases.
• Case 1: Ideally, θ and α can be directly estimated,
implying a = θ or a = α [37].
6• Case 2: In most practical cases, a is a function of θ and
α, implying a = f(θ, α) [34], [38], [39].
Using Theorem 1, the MECD can prepare the MEB quantiza-
tion rules offline for the two cases as follows.
A. Offline MEB Quantization Rule for Case 1 (a = θ or α)
Since a is either θ or α in Case 1, we obtain a ∼
U(amin, amax), where −amin = amax > 0. Hence, a is
zero mean, variance σ2a =
a2max
3 , and fA(x) =
1
2amax
, x ∈
[−amax, amax]. For uniformly distributed input a, only a uni-
form quantizer can satisfy (5); thus, the decision boundary of
an interval is
bm =
(
2m
M − 1 − 1
)
amax. (6)
B. Offline MEB Quantization Rule for Case 2 (a = f(θ, α))
Without loss of generality, we express a in this case as
a = g1(θ)g2(α) + c, (7)
where g1(θ) is a function of θ, g2(α) is a function of α, and c
is a constant. We use g1 and g2 in the following for simplicity.
Theorem 2: Given the independent random variables α and
θ and g1 ∈ [gmin1gmax1] and g2 ∈ [gmin2, gmax2], an ED’s IQI
parameter a with the expression of (7) has the PDF fA(x),
which can be derived as follows.
If gmin1gmax2 < gmax1gmin2,
fA(x) =
 τ1(x− c), gmin1gmin2 < g < gmin1gmax2τ2(x− c), gmin1gmax2 < g < gmax1gmin2
τ3(x− c), gmax1gmin2 < g < gmax1gmax2
, (8)
if gmin1gmax2 > gmax1gmin2,
fA(x) =
 τ1(x− c), gmin1gmin2 < g < gmax1gmin2τ4(x− c), gmax1gmin2 < g < gmin1gmax2
τ3(x− c), gmin1gmax2 < g < gmax1gmax2
, (9)
if gmin1gmax2 = gmax1gmin2,
fA(x) =
{
τ1(x− c), gmin1gmin2 < g < gmin1gmax2
τ3(x− c), gmin1gmax2 < g < gmax1gmax2 ,
(10)
where
τi(x) =
∫ κt(i)
κb(i)
1
x
fG1(x)fG2(g/x)dx, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (11)
where fG1(x) and fG2(x) are the PDFs of g1 and g2, re-
spectively, κt = [g/gmin2, g/gmin2, gmax1, gmax1], and κb =
[gmin1, g/gmax2, g/gmax2, gmin1].
Proof : See Appendix B.
Let Fτ1 , Fτ2 , Fτ3 , and Fτ4 represent the antiderivative
functions of τ1(x − c), τ2(x − c), τ3(x − c) and τ4(x − c),
respectively, b0 = amin, G1 = gmin1gmax2, G2 = gmax1gmin2,
and G3 = gmax1gmax2. Using Theorem 1, MECD can obtain
the MEB boundaries for eq. (8) as
bm+1 =

F−1τ2
(
1
M − Fτ1 (G1) + Fτ1(bm) + Fτ2 (G1)
)
,
if bm < G1, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) < 1M
F−1τ1
(
1
M + Fτ1(bm)
)
,
if bm < G1, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) > 1M
F−1τ3
(
1
M − Fτ2 (G2) + Fτ2(bm) + Fτ3 (G2)
)
,
if G1 < bm < G2, (Fτ2 (G2)− Fτ2(bm)) < 1M
F−1τ2
(
1
M + Fτ2(bm)
)
,
if G1 < bm < G2, (Fτ2 (G2)− Fτ2(bm)) > 1M
F−1τ3
(
1
M + Fτ3 (bm)
)
,
if G2 < bm < G3,m < M
.
(12)
The MEB boundaries for eq. (9) can be given by
bm+1 =

F−1τ4
(
1
M − Fτ1 (G1) + Fτ1(bm) + Fτ4 (G1)
)
,
if bm < G2, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) < 1M
F−1τ1
(
1
M + Fτ1(bm)
)
,
if bm < G2, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) > 1M
F−1τ3
(
1
M − Fτ4 (G1) + Fτ4(bm) + Fτ3 (G1)
)
,
if G2 < bm < G1, (Fτ4 (G1)− Fτ4(bm)) < 1M
F−1τ4
(
1
M + Fτ4(bm)
)
,
if G2 < bm < G1, (Fτ4 (G1)− Fτ4(bm)) > 1M
F−1τ3
(
1
M + Fτ3 (bm)
)
,
if G1 < bm < G3,m < M
.
(13)
The MEB boundaries for eq. (10) can be given by
bm+1 =

F−1τ3
(
1
M − Fτ1 (G1) + Fτ1(bm) + Fτ3 (G1)
)
,
if bm < G1, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) < 1M
F−1τ1
(
1
M + Fτ1(bm)
)
,
if bm < G1, (Fτ1 (G1)− Fτ1(bm)) > 1M
F−1τ3
(
1
M + Fτ3 (bm)
)
,
if G1 < bm < G3,m < M
.
(14)
Based on the derivations above, the MEB quantization rule
can be determined using Algorithm 1.
Case study: We present a case study to show how to
practically apply our general Algorithm 1. We consider a =
1
2 +
1
2 (1 +α) cos θ since this representative a can be available
in most IQI estimation methods. For example, study [38] can
produce ηt = 1−uu , where <(u) = a. Studies [34] and [39] can
produce k1, k2, k3, and k4, and the same ηt can be obtained
by ηt = k3k1 . Through some manipulations, we can obtain
a = 1<(ηt+1) .
Fig. 4 compares the simulation and analytical density of this
a, where (a), (b), and (c) can correspond to eq. (8), (9), and
(10), respectively. Regarding the analytical results, we first
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Fig. 4. Simulated density and analytical density of a: (a) θm = 5pi36 , αm = 0.04; (b) θm =
pi
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, αm = 0.1; (c) θm = pi6 , αm = 0.0718.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the MEB quantization rule.
1: Inputs:
θm, αm, b0 = amin, and the expression of a.
2: Calculate a ∈ [amin, amax] using θm and αm.
3: Rewrite a to get g1, g2, and c using (7).
4: Given that θ ∼ U(−θm, θm) and α ∼ U(−αm, αm), fG1(x)
of g1 and fG2(x) of g2 can be derived, respectively.
5: if gmin1gmax2 < gmax1gmin2 then
6: Obtain fA(x) using (8).
7: for m← 0 to M − 1 do
8: Obtain bm+1 according to (12).
9: end for
10: else if gmin1gmax2 > gmax1gmin2 then
11: Obtain fA(x) using (9).
12: for m← 0 to M − 1 do
13: Obtain bm+1 according to (13).
14: end for
15: else if gmin1gmax2 = gmax1gmin2 then
16: Obtain fA(x) using (10).
17: for m← 0 to M − 1 do
18: Obtain bm+1 according to (14).
19: end for
20: end if
21: Outputs: bm+1
make g1 = 12 (1 + α), g2 = cos θ, c =
1
2 using (7) so that
fG1(x) and fG2(x) can be given by
fG1(x) =
1
θm
√
1− x2 , x ∈ [cos θm, 1]
fG2(x) =
1
αm
, x ∈
[
1− αm
2
,
1 + αm
2
]
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (8), (9), and (10), fA(x) of the three
cases can be obtained by comparing (1 +αm) cos θm and 1−
αm, and τ1(x), τ2(x), τ3(x), and τ4(x) become
τ1(x) =
1
θmαm
ln

x
cos θm
+
√(
x
cos θm
)2
− x2
1−αm
2 +
√(
1−αm
2
)2 − x2
 (16)
τ2(x) =
1
θmαm
ln
 1+αm2 +
√(
1+αm
2
)2 − x2
1−αm
2 +
√(
1−αm
2
)2 − x2
 (17)
τ3(x) =
1
θmαm
ln
1 + αm
2x
+
√(
1 + αm
2x
)2
− 1
 (18)
τ4(x) =
1
θmαm
ln
 1
cos θm
+
√(
1
cos θm
)2
− 1
 . (19)
The segmented functions τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4 represent the
analytical results in Fig.4. Regarding the simulation results, we
randomly generate 105 samples of θ and α according to their
PDFs, and plot the corresponding PDF of a statistically. As
expected, the analytical and simulation results closely match,
which validates our derivations in Theorem 2.
We take the case of (1 + αm) cos θm < 1 − αm as an
example. In practical offline preparations, MECD can use
Algorithm 1 to obtain g1(α) = 12 (1 + α), g2(θ) = cos θ,
c = 12 using (7), calculate fA(x) using (8) (16) (17) (18), and
finally determine the MEB boundaries by substituting fA(x)
into (12).
IV. INTEGRATION OF PHY-ID INTO THE NDN-IOT
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we consider the offline preparation has been
completed, and EDA’s PHY-IDA has been generated using our
MEB quantization and registered by MECD. Fig. 5 illustrates
our NDN signature scheme. Both the NDN data packet and
certificate packet have the same format, which consists of the
Name, Content, Signature Value and KeyLocator fields. The
primary purpose of Name is to facilitate the name-indexed
content identification and routing. To this end, application-
driven NDN can define the hierarchical structure Name, e.g.,
/ndn/ucla.edu/building/melnitz/studio/1/data/sensor/J/voltage
/<timestamp> [6], where the segment sensor/J can denote
EDA at the network layer. The Signature Value is the
result of signing on the Content, which requires asymmetric
encryption. The name of the signing key is put in KeyLocator
so that the verifier can retrieve the public key in the same
manner as it can retrieve the signed data packet for signature
verification.
We consider that EDB is claiming PHY-IDA in the medium
access control layer frame header of the unsigned NDN data
packets to the MECD. As shown in the figure, the NDN data
8Name:  /ndn/ucla.edu/building/
melnitz/studio/1/data/sensor/J/
voltage/<timestamp>
Content:  b4:85:2a...
Signature Value: 
KeyLocator: /domain/.../key6
IoT ED
Data Packet (unsigned)
Name:  /ndn/ucla.edu/building/
melnitz/studio/1/data/sensor/J/
voltage/<timestamp>
Content:  b4:85:2a...
Signature Value:  68:5f:3e...
KeyLocator: /domain/.../key6
Data Packet (signed)
Name:  /domain/.../key6
Content:  a2:25:3a...
Signature Value:  66:1e:2c...
KeyLocator: /domain/.../key8
Certificate (key)
MECD
Name:  /domain/.../key56
Content:  b2:20:1a...
Signature Value:  66:1e:2c...
KeyLocator: /domain/.../key66
Certificate (key)
…… 
Trust 
Anchor
/domain/.../key66
Fig. 5. Proposed NDN-IoT authentication.
packet leaves Signature Value empty. Since the actual IQI
of EDB inevitably affects all unsigned packets at physical
layer, the MECD is able to obtain the EDB-specific aB and
generate B = (aB , q(aB))PHY-IDB . MECD can extract the
claimed PHY-IDA and check if it can be mapped to the
name “...sensor/J...” that falls in its name prefix. If correct,
MECD can use PHY-IDA as an index to find the registered
A = (aA, q(aA))PHY-IDA , and the identity of EDB can be ver-
ified by comparing A and B using our two-step authentication
method. In brief, if q(aA) 6= q(aB), it means the claimed
PHY-IDA does not belong to this EDB , and thus MECD
should reject the NDN data packet of EDB . If q(aA) = q(aB),
MECD will further compare aA and aB . If they are identical,
MECD can start to sign on every data packet on behalf of the
validated EDA. Otherwise, MECD rejects EDB . In NDN, the
name in KeyLocator of the signed data packet could point to
a certificate for retrieving the public key. The certificate can
be linked to the next one until it finally reaches the pre-agreed
trust anchor. The multiple retrieved keys between the unsigned
data packet and the trust anchor form a trust chain to protect
the authentication scheme [23].
V. ONLINE TWO-STEP AUTHENTICATION
This section presents the accurate online two-step authenti-
cation technique in the scenario that a large number of EDs are
densely deployed. We consider that an EDB (EDB 6= EDA)
moves to the coverage of the MECD and claims PHY-IDA. As
aforementioned, MECD can obtain (aˆB , q(aˆB))PHY-IDA from
EDB’s packets and find (aA, q(aA))PHY-IDA from the whitelist.
In step 1, we directly compare q(aˆB) with the registered
q(aA). Since our MEB quantization minimizes the probability
of two IQI parameters falling into the same quantization
interval, q(aA) 6= q(aˆB) can be produced in most cases.
However, if aA and aB are very close, it is possible to obtain
q(aA) = q(aˆB). The chance of encountering this problem can
increase when a large number of EDs are involved. To resolve
this problem, we further propose another virtual boundary, bv ,
for the step 2 examination.
In step 2, this problem can be mathematically formulated as
aA 6= aB , but q(aA) and q(aB) fall in the interval [bm, bm+1].
We assume aA and aB have been registered so that MECD
knows aA and aB . Note that the assumption of known aB can
be relaxed without changing the authentication performance,
as will be discussed later. For presentation simplicity, we set
that aˆx = ax + na is under the step 2 test, where x = A
or B. Since the same ax affects all RF signals or even all
subcarriers of an OFDM signal [16], [40], it is considered that
Ns-independent estimation samples of aˆx can be conveniently
observed from Np packets. At the MECD, the offset between
aA and the k-th aˆx[k] is
y[k] = aˆx[k] − aA = a∆ + na[k], k = 1, 2, · · · , Ns (20)
where a∆ = ax − aA. Based on (20), a binary hypothesis
testing can be modeled by{ H0 : a∆ = 0
H1 : a∆ 6= 0 , (21)
where H0 implies ax = aA, and H1 means ax = aB .
Therefore, y[k] ∼ N (0, σ2) under H0 with the likelihood
function pY (y|H0) and y[k] ∼ N (a∆, σ2) under H1 with the
likelihood function pY (y|H1). Since q(aA) = q(aˆB), aA is
extremely close to aB , implying the difficulty in detecting the
nonzero a∆ under H1.
1) Known σ2: If σ2 is known, the Neyman-Pearson lemma
can be used to differentiate the hypotheses since it can
maximize the probability of detecting H1 given a false alarm
rate [41]. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) based on Ns samples
is
(
pY (y|H1)
pY (y|H0)
)Ns
, which produces
LNP =
r
∑Ns
k=1 y[k]
a∆Ns
H0
≶
H1
bv, (22)
where r = a
2
∆
σ2 is the offset-to-noise ratio, bv denotes the
virtual boundary for differentiating aA and aB , and LNP ∼
N
(
r, r
2σ2
Nsa2∆
)
under H1. If LNP > bv , aA and aB (i.e., H1)
can be differentiated; otherwise, H0 is determined. Given a
required false alarm rate ρ, the bv can be given by
bv = Q
−1(ρ)
√
r
Ns
, (23)
where Q−1(·) is the inverse of the Q-function, and ρ can be
mathematically defined by
ρ=
∫ ∞
bv
√
Ns
2rpi
exp
(
−Nsx
2
2r
)
dx. (24)
The differentiation rate is defined by
rD = Pr(LNP > bv|H1) = Q
(√
rNs
(
bv
r
− 1
))
. (25)
More generally, if aB is not registered, a∆ becomes unknown.
In this case, (22) can become LNP = 1Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y[k] and (23)
can become bv = σ√NsQ
−1(ρ). As a result, the differentiation
performance remains unchanged since the new LNP and bv can
result in the same rD in (25).
92) Unknown σ2: In practice, the variance of the estimation
noise is not always available. If σ2 is unknown, we can use the
generalized LRT (GLRT) to process the offset samples y[k].
In this case, the GLRT-based hypothesis decision can be made
by
LGLRT =
(Ns − 1)
(∑Ns
k=1 y[k]
)2
Ns
∑Ns
k=1(y[k] − 1Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y[k])
2
H0
≶
H1
bv, (26)
where the PDF of LGLRT is
LGLRT ∼
{
F (1, Ns − 1) underH0
F ′(1, Ns − 1, Nsa
2
∆
σ2 ) underH1
, (27)
where F and F ′ denote central/non-central FisherSnedecor
distributions (F -distribution). Please see Appendix C for the
proofs of (26) and (27).
Let FLGLRT(x|H0/H1) denote the cumulative distribution
function of LGLRT, the required ρ equals
ρ=1−FLGLRT(bv, 1, Ns − 1|H0) = 1− I bv
bv+Ns−1
(
1
2
,
Ns − 1
2
)
= 1−Ns(Ns − 1)
∫ bv
bv+Ns−1
0
(1− t)Ns−2dt, (28)
where Ix(d1, d2) is the regularized incomplete beta function.
Given that d1 and d2 are positive integers in our case,
Ix(d1, d2) can be calculated by
Ix(d1, d2) =
(d1 + d2 − 1)!
∫ x
0
td1−1(1− t)d2−1dt
(d1 − 1)!(d2 − 1)! .
Therefore, bv can be obtained by solving (28). Consequently,
both LGLRT and bv are independent of the unknown σ2.
rD can be mathematically computed by
rD = Pr(LGLRT > bv|H1)
=1−
∞∑
i=0
e−Nsa2∆2σ2
i!
(
Nsa
2
∆
2σ2
)iI bv
bv+Ns−1
(
1
2
+i,
Ns − 1
2
)
(29)
≈ 1− e−
Ns(Ns−1)a2∆
2σ2(bv+Ns−1)
Ns−2∑
i=0
(
Ns(Ns − 1)a2∆
2σ2(bv +Ns − 1)
)i
1
i!
×
(
bv
bv +Ns − 1
)i+1(
1 +
Ns−2−i∑
n=1
( n∏
m=1
m+ i
m
)
×
( Ns − 1
bv +Ns − 1
)n)
. (30)
Since (29) cannot be used directly for numerical computations,
we give its approximation in (30) according to [42].
Once aA and aB are successfully differentiated us-
ing either (22) or (26), the MECD can adjust PHY-IDA
and PHY-IDB . For example, PHY-IDA remains unchanged,
whereas PHY-IDB = hash(q(aB) + ), where  is a user-
defined number for guaranteeing PHY-IDA 6= PHY-IDB . In
addition, one can impose a new boundary b˜ = aA+aB2 to divide
aA and aB into two different intervals as aA ∈ [bm, b˜] and
aB ∈ [˜b, bm+1]. In doing so, if aB appears again, the step 2
test can be avoided since aB can be differentiated from aA by
the step 1 test. Additionally, the H in bits after the insertion
of b˜ becomes
H = log2M
(1− 1M )C
1
CD
1
D (31)
where C = 1∫ aB+aA
2
bm
fA(x)dx
and D = 1∫ bm+1
aA+aB
2
fA(x)dx
.
VI. SIGNING TASK OFFLOADING ALGORITHM
It is considered that EDB has been authenticated as EDA
using the method presented in the previous section. Then, the
MECD can start to offload the signing task from the verified
EDA.
The signing task can be summarized as follows: EDA has
Np unsigned NDN data packets that need to be signed and
published to NDN. MECD can consider its own available time
to decide to undertake Np1 out of the Np packets and leave
Np2 = Np−Np1 packets to EDA. We assume that the compu-
tational workload of signing each packet is Bs (in the number
of bits), and the signing of all Np packets should be completed
before the deadline T . However, the MECD is considered to
be available only for the duration φT , where 0 < φ < 1.
fMEC and fED are the fixed CPU-cycle frequency per second
of MECD and EDA, respectively, and Cb is the number of CPU
cycles required for computing 1 bit of the input task. Since
all signed NDN data packets need to be published to NDN
through gateway/MECD regardless of whether the offloading
is performed or not, there is no need to consider the time cost
for additional task uploading/downloading between the MECD
and EDA. The time difference between EDA and MECD for
completing the signing of the same NP packets is given by
∆t = NpBsCb
(
1
fED
− 1
fMEC
)
. (32)
Recall the online phase procedure (Fig.3). EDA sends
the signing request to MECD. Then, MECD considers the
partitioning of the signing task in the packet granularity and
replies that the first Np1 unsigned packets can be sent. It is
assumed that the MECD can complete the signing encryption
of Np1 packets in time t1 and that EDA can complete up to
Np2 packets within t2. This procedure can be mathematically
summarized as a minimax problem as
min
Np1,Np2
max (t1, t2) (33)
s.t. 0 6 t1 =
Np1BsCb
fMEC
6 φT, (34)
0 6 t2 =
Np2BsCb
fED
6 T, (35)
Np1 +Np2 = NP . (36)
Ideally, setting t1 = t2 can achieve the shortest time. If the
calculated Np1 and Np2 are not integers, we intentionally use
dNp1e and bNp2c since BsCbfED > BsCbfMEC .
Although the MECD can help complete the signing task
efficiently, it may introduce the single-point-of-failure problem
into the system as the MECD may become out of service. To
avoid this, the use of MECD for task offloading is optional in
our system, and the MECD will accept ED’s signing request
10
only when the MECD is available, as shown in the online
procedures.
Finally, the whole signing task offloading procedures with
our offline MEB preparations and online authentication are
summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm of offline/online phases and signing
task offloading.
1: Offline Phase:
2: MECD determines bm using (6) for Case 1 or using Algorithm
1 for Case 2.
3: MECD registers the legitimate EDA and defines A =
(aA, q(aA))PHY-IDA , where q(aA) ∈ BA = [bm, bm+1].
4: Online Phase:
5: Quantize aˆB to obtain q(aˆB) ∈ BB .
6: if BA 6= BB then
7: MECD rejects EDB in the step 1 test.
8: else
9: Compute offset y[k] using (20) for step 2 test.
10: if σ2 is known then
11: Obtain virtual boundary bv using (23) and test the EDB
using (22).
12: else if σ2 is unknown then
13: Obtain bv by solving (28) and test EDB using (26).
14: end if
15: if Step 2 test is not passed then
16: MECD rejects EDB .
17: else
18: Signing Task Offloading:
19: MECD accepts EDB’s unsigned NDN packets for signing
task offloading using (33), (34), (35), and (36).
20: end if
21: end if
22: End of the algorithm.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this system evaluation section, we first show the perfor-
mance improvements in terms of the authentication accuracy
and authentication time efficiency. Then, we analyze the
robustness performance in defending against several malicious
impersonation attacks.
A. Numerical Results
We consider the OFDM communication between IoT EDs
and MECD. The QPSK modulated signal with 512 sub-carriers
is used when preparing every NDN data packet. The trans-
mitted signal is affected by the ED-specific IQI parameters,
passes through the multi-path channel, and finally arrives at
the MECD, as shown in eq. (1). We consider that the circulant
channel matrix H with the first column formed by an L 1
channel impulse response vector h = [h(1), h(2), · · · , h(L)]T ,
where the length L = 8. The elements of h are i.i.d. complex
circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables as h ∼
CN (0, 2IL). Regarding the IQI parameters, θ ∼ U(−θm, θm),
α ∼ U(−αm, αm), where θm = 5pi36 , αm = 0.04 if not
otherwise specified. We consider a = 12 +
1
2 (1 + α) cos θ as
used earlier in the example study for the offline quantization
rule preparation and use [30] to obtain the estimated aˆ in the
online test phase; the other variables, such as Np, Ns, M , and
r, will be given later in each specific evaluation figure.
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Fig. 6 shows the offline MEB quantization boundaries
derived by Algorithm 1 with the comparison of the two
other methods, which are named uniform and random. To be
specific, the widths of all M quantization intervals are the
same regardless of the PDF of a in the uniform method [30].
In the random method, all boundaries are randomly picked
within [amin, amax]. It is observed that the MEB boundary value
grows faster than those of the other two compared methods.
This result occurs because the density of a at the beginning
is low, as shown in Fig. 4 (a), resulting in wider intervals for
determining the first several bm. However, the width of our
MEB quantization intervals narrows as the density increases.
The rD and the corresponding virtual boundary bv of
our online step 2 test are evaluated in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8,
respectively. In this simulation, we choose two close IQI
parameters, aA = 1.00166 and aB = 1.00177, indicating that
a∆ = aA−aB is equal to only 0.011%×aA. It is challenging
to handle this small a∆ by the step 1 test since this likely
results in q(aA) = q(aB), and thus, the step 2 test is needed. It
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devices, M = 2000, ρ = 0.01, Ns = 512 and r = 0.03.
shows that rD of both known/unknown σ2 cases keep growing
with increasing r and ρ. This increase occurs because for a
fixed r, a larger ρ could lead to a smaller bv , as shown in
Fig. 8 (a) and (b). However, LNP is monotonically increasing
with respect to r based on eq. (22), and LGLRT is independent
of r based on (26). Fig.8 also shows that bv of case (b) is
independent of r compared to bv of case (a) since r becomes
the unknown in case (b).
After the separate evaluations of the proposed MEB quan-
tization and the online test above, we combine them to
evaluate the authentication accuracy performance by executing
Algorithm 2. To thoroughly test the accuracy in the large
number of IoT EDs, we randomly create up to 2000 IoT EDs
with different IQI values and register them as the legitimate
devices in the offline phase. In each round of the online
authentication test, we either randomly generate an attacker or
pick up a legitimate one from 2000 IoT EDs. It is further con-
sidered that the attacker is sufficiently sophisticated to claim
a legitimate PHY-ID and that the attacker’s IQI parameter,
aATTK , is different from any of the legitimate ones. After
the examination of all EDs one by one, we show the correct
authentication probability (CAP) in Fig. 9, where the CAP is
defined as the number of correct authentication decisions made
by Algorithm 2 divided by the total authentication attempts.
In the step 1 test, CAP of our MEB method outperforms those
of the uniform and random methods, which demonstrates the
accuracy improvement gained by using our MEB quantizer.
The CAP of our MEB (step 1 test) is consistently larger than
95% when the number of tested IoT EDs grows from 0 to
200. However, more IoT EDs can lead to a higher probability
of a failed step 1 test, which results in decreased CAPs when
a large number of EDs appear. In this case, our step 2 test can
further elevate the CAP as shown by the curves of MEB steps
1&2 under both known/unknown σ2.
According to Algorithm 2, the MECD could offload the
signing task only if our online two-step test authenticates
the ED. Next, we evaluate the time efficiency improvement
by the signing task offloading given by (33), (34), (35),
and (36). Three different types of devices are considered to
serve as either an IoT ED or an MECD. Specifically, we use
the Texas Instrument Zigbee cc2430 node with a 32 MHz
processor, which is commonly used for deploying IoT-based
IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor networks. This device serves
as the constrained ED. A Raspberry Pi 3 model-B with a
1.2 GHz CPU and a laptop with a 2.4 GHz CPU serve as
MECDP and MECDL, respectively. To compare the time
efficiency, the same RSA and ECC signing algorithm is run
by the three devices to obtain the fixed ξ = BsCbfED/MEC for each
device. We assume that all NDN-IoT data packets’ contents
have been hashed to get the fixed-length digests, and thus the
same ξ is spent in signing on the digest for every NDN-IoT
data packet. We show the time Npξ needed by each type of
device to complete the Np NDN-IoT packets’ signings in Fig.
10, where φ = 1, 0.3 and 0.025, respectively, indicate that
100%, 30%, and 2.5% of the evaluation time of MECDL/P is
available for the signing task offloading. The optimal execution
time of using (33) is shown by MECDL/P -ED (optim.). In
Figs. 10 (a) (b) (d) and (e), the execution time is reduced
significantly since all Np packets are signed by either MECDL
or MECDP instead of the constrained ED. In Fig. 10 (c) and
(f), the extremely busy MECDL/P (φ = 0.025) is not able
to undertake all Np signings, and as a result the curves of
MECDL/P become close to the curve of the IoT ED. In this
case, our optimization offloading method can further reduce
the execution time compared to letting either the MECDL/P
or the IoT ED complete all tasks alone.
B. Analysis of the Robustness Enhancement
In this subsection, we analyze the robustness improvement
gained through integrating the PHY-ID into the MEC-enabled
NDN-IoT networks. It is considered that an attacker (ATTK) is
trying to impersonate the legitimate EDA in order to injects his
poisoned contents into NDN. This ATTK can be aware of the
current pending interest for particular content or can anticipate
the popular interests of consumers, and thus this ATTK is able
to produce poisoned content under the popular name prefix
and sign contents using the compromised key. Hence, once
MECD/gateway is fooled, the poisoned content will be cached
at NDN, and furthermore, copies of the poisoned content can
be forwarded to any consumer with matched interests without
triggering any alarm since the signature of ATTK is valid.
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Attack 1: It is assumed that an ATTK can act as the man-
in-the-middle between EDA and MECD but does not know
the authentication scheme. ATTK can passively eavesdrop on
all NDN-IoT packets that are transmitted by the legitimate
EDA without being detected. To mimic EDA, this ATTK can
send the intercepted packets to the MECD without any content
modification (i.e., replay attacking). However, the device-
specific IQI parameter, aATTK , that is associated with ATTK’s
RF hardware can inevitably affect the replayed packet. In our
method, MECD can stealthily extract aATTK from the re-
played packets and generate (aˆATTK , q(aˆATTK))PHY-IDATTK
rather than actively requesting that any pre-agreed se-
cret be embedded into the NDN packet for authentication.
Through checking the registered (aA, q(aA)), MECD can find
(aˆATTK , q(aˆATTK)) 6= (aA, q(aA)) and detect the presence
of the ATTK since the ATTK’s amplitude mismatch and phase-
shift mismatch cannot be simultaneously the same as those of
EDA. Consequently, our method is secure against the replay
attacks.
Attack 2: It is considered that, occasionally, ATTK’s aATTK
is similar to aA, which may challenge our authentication
scheme if q(aA) = q(aˆATTK). Our offline/online phases
are designed with a full consideration of this potential risk.
At first, our offline MEB quantization technique ensures that
aATTK and aA can be quantized into different intervals with
maximized probability. Then, as demonstrated in Fig. 9, our
two-step authentication technique can accurately differentiate
aATTK and aA even if q(aA) = q(aˆATTK). In addition, mo-
tivated by the MAMO technique [16], we find that exploiting
more RF features, such as the carrier frequency offset (CFO),
can further prevent this risk for two reasons: 1) taking more RF
features into account can likely lead to sufficiently different
aATTK and aA, and 2) our method that already uses two
features (i.e., α and θ) can be extended to incorporate more
RF features. Taking the CFO as an example, we assume that
(7) becomes a = xg3(ψ) + c, where x = g1(α)g2(θ) and ψ is
the CFO parameter. After obtaining the PDF of x using (11),
xg3(ψ) + c can be processed as in the case of two features by
implementing Algorithm 1. Consequently, using our offline
MEB quantization technique, online two-step authentication
technique, and this potential MAMO technique together can
make the NDN-IoT network robust to this kind of ATTK.
Attack 3: We assume that the ATTK with strong computing
power can compromise the signing key of EDA, decipher
our MEB quantization rule, and spoof and claim the le-
gitimate PHY-IDA to the MECD. In this case, ATTK can
be authenticated as legitimate by the traditional encryption-
based authentication method since the signature can be created
by ATTK using the compromised signing key of EDA. In
our method, the claimed PHY-IDA is not directly trusted by
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MECD but is used only as an index to find the registered aA.
In fact, MECD generates the aATTK via physical-layer RF
analysis. As long as aA 6= aATTK , MECD can prevent ATTK
with a high CAP and thereby refuse to send the poisoned
contents to the NDN. If the claimed PHY-ID cannot point
to a registered aA, this ATTK’s packets will be immediately
rejected. As a result, our MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network is
secure against this computation-based PHY-ID spoofing attack.
In summary, Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8 validate the proposed
MEB quantization technique and the two-step authentication
technique. Fig. 9 demonstrates the high authentication accu-
racy in the case of a large number of EDs. Fig. 10 demon-
strates the time efficiency enhancement using our signing task
offloading. Finally, the analysis in Section VII-B demonstrates
the stronger robustness of our method gained by integrating
the PHY-ID into the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a design that integrates the PHY
fingerprinting into the NDN signature scheme for the MEC-
enabled NDN-IoT networks. With the aid of an MECD, the
device-specific PHY-ID associated with the RF hardware of
an IoT device can be generated using the proposed MEB
quantization technique. This PHY-ID is then seamlessly in-
tegrated into the NDN signature with limited computational
complexity imposed on the resource-constrained IoT devices.
As a result, the MECD can examine IoT devices using our
two-step authentication method and offload the signing task
from the authenticated IoT device in an optimal manner.
The evaluation results show that the MEC-enabled NDN-
IoT networks can be improved in terms of the authentication
accuracy, time efficiency, and robustness.
APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Given M quantization levels, the entropy H can be maxi-
mized as
max
b
(
H = −
M∑
m=1
f˜A(a[m]) log2
(
f˜A(a[m])
))
(37)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
f˜A(a[m]) =
M∑
m=1
(∫ bm+1
bm
fA(x)dx
)
= 1, (38)
amin 6 b0 6 b1 6 · · · 6 bM 6 amax (39)
where b = [b0, b1, · · · , bM ]. In fact, f˜A(a[m]) is dependent on
[amin, amax], fA(x), and bm in (3), but only bm can be adjusted
to maximize H . Setting the Lagrange multiplier variables as
λ, (37) can be solved by
∂
(
M∑
m=1
f˜A(a[m]) log2(f˜A(a[m]))− λ(
M∑
m=1
f˜A(a[m])− 1)
)
∂f˜A(a[m])
=
M∑
m=1
log2(f˜A(a[m])) +M
(
1
ln 2
− λ
)
= 0. (40)
Since every f˜A(a[m]) is only dependent on λ and∑M
m=1 f˜A(a[m]) = 1, we can conclude that H can be
maximized by setting f˜A(a[m]) = Fa(bm+1) − Fa(bm) = 1M
and b0 = amin, which yields (5).
APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
Using (7), the key point of deriving fA(·) becomes how to
figure out the distribution of the product of g1 and g2. Note
that the α-related g1 and the θ-related g2 are independent of
each other. We define a transformation G1 = {(g1, g2)|gmin1 <
g1 < gmax1, gmin2 < g2 < gmax2} → G2 = {(x, g)|gmin1 < x <
gmax1, xgmin2 < g < xgmax2} as
X = g1, G = g1g2. (41)
Therefore, the inverse transformation function can be given by
f(x, g) =
[
x,
g
x
]T
, (42)
and the Jacobian of f(x, g) is
Jf(x,g) =
[
∂f(x,g)(1)
∂x
∂f(x,g)(2)
∂x
∂f(x,g)(1)
∂g
∂f(x,g)(2)
∂g
]
=
[
1 0
− gx2 1x
]
. (43)
The PDF of g1g2 can be computed based on the joint PDF of
X and G, (x, g) ∈ G2, as∫
D
fX,G(x, g)dx =
∫
D
fG1(f(x, g)(1))fG2(f(x, g)(2))
× det(Jf(x,g))dx =
∫
D
fG1(x)fG2
( g
x
) 1
x
dx, (44)
where D is the region [gmin1, gmax1] with appropriate sub-
intervals as shown in (11). Finally, replacing x with x − c
in (44) can yield the eq. (8), (9) and (10) in Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF FOR EQ. (26) AND (27)
Without loss of generality, let y = [y[1], y[2], · · · , y[Ns]]T ,
and (20) can be rewritten as y = H0a∆ +na, where H0 is the
Ns×p matrix of rank p, a∆ is a p×1 offset vector, and na is
the Ns × 1 noise vector with PDF N (0, σ2INs). We replace
a∆ with Aa∆ in (21), where A is an r ×Ns matrix of rank
r. Then, the GLRT of y with unknown σ2 is [41, Eq. (9.14)]
LGLRT =
Ns − p
r
(Aaˆ∆)
T (A(HT0 H0)
−1AT )−1(Aaˆ∆)
yT (INs −H0(HT0 H0)−1HT0 )y
, (45)
where aˆ∆ = (HT0 H0)
−1HT0 y. Considering our system, p =
1, r = 1,A = 1 and H0 = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T can be substituted
into (45) to decide H0/H0 as
LGLRT=
(Ns − 1)aˆT∆(HT0 H0)aˆ∆
yTy − yTH0(HT0 H0)−1HT0 y
=
(Ns − 1)Nsaˆ2∆
Ns∑
k=1
y2[k] − aˆT∆(HT0 H0)T aˆ∆
=
Ns(Ns − 1)aˆ2∆
Ns∑
k=1
(y[k] − aˆ∆)2
H0
≶
H1
bv,
(46)
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which confirms (26). Note that aˆ∆ = 1Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y[k] so that
1
Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y
2
[k] − aˆ2∆ = 1Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y
2
[k] − 2aˆ∆( 1Ns
∑Ns
k=1 y[k]) +
aˆ2∆ =
1
Ns
∑Ns
k=1(y[k] − aˆ∆)2 is used in deriving (46).
Setting x1 = ytCy = (
√
Nsaˆ∆/σ)
2, where C =
H0(H
T
0 H0)
−1HT0 /σ
2, and x2 = yTBy, where the rank of
B = (INs − H0(HT0 H0)−1HT0 )/σ2 is Ns − 1, we can get
LGLRT =
x1
x2/(Ns−1) . Since
√
x1 ∼ N (
√
Nsa∆
σ , 1), x1 ∼ χ21
under H0 and x1 ∼ χ′21 (Nsa
2
∆
σ2 ) under H1, where χ21 and
χ′21 (
Nsa
2
∆
σ2 ) are the central/non-central chi-square distribution
with 1 degree of freedom and Nsa
2
∆
σ2 is the noncentrality param-
eter. B is idempotent as B2 = B. Since HT0 B = BH0 = 0,
we obtain x2 ∼ χ2Ns−1 according to [41, Eq.(2.29)]. Since
C(σ2INs)B = 0, x1 and x2 are independent [43]. Given that
the ratio of two independent χ2 random variables leads to an
F -distributed random variable, the PDF of LGLRT is
LGLRT =
x1
x2
Ns−1
∼
{
F (1, Ns − 1) underH0
F ′(1, Ns − 1, Nsa
2
∆
σ2 ) underH1
, (47)
which confirms eq. (27).
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